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In the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the
retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity
contracts to deter the entry of a more efficient rival, contrary to what happens in
the homogenous product case. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent’s
inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. As a result, a retailer who considers
rejecting the exclusivity clause expects to earn much less than the incumbent’s
monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can offer high enough
an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign on the contract and achieve
exclusion.
KEYWORDS: vertical differentiation, exclusive dealing, contracts, naked ex-
clusion, monopolization.
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1 Introduction
Exclusivity clauses often govern commercial relationships between firms. Those clauses
can take various forms.1 In this paper, the focus is on one-sided clauses that commit a
retailer to buy from a single producer, arguably the ones that place the most restrictions
on commerce. As for other kinds of vertical restraints, there is a lively debate about the
likely consequences of such clauses on competition and the attention they should re-
ceive from antitrust authorities.2 Building on the existing naked exclusion literature, I
construct a stylized model in which products are vertically differentiated and an incum-
bent monopolist has the possibility of offering exclusivity contracts to retailers before a
potential entrant makes its decision about developing a superior product. I show that,
contrary to what happens in the homogenous product case, intense competition at the
retail level (in the form of Bertrand competition) helps the incumbent deter the entry
of his rival. Indeed, whereas efficiency dictates that the incumbent firm be shut down,
the exclusion of the potential entrant is the only equilibrium outcome when retailers
can easily steal business from each other.
An important implication of this result, along with the other ones reviewed below,
is that competition authorities should not take pretext of intense retail competition
to dismiss the claims that exclusivity contracts can threaten the competitive structure
of an industry. Other factors, for instance the nature of competition at the upstream
level, ought to be taken into account as well.
As a matter of fact, US courts and antitrust practitioners gave early credence to
the possibility of foreclosing rivals through vertical integration or other vertical arrange-
ments.3 Yet, in the 1970s, some leading scholars mounted a critique of what constituted,
in their eyes, the use of a logically-flawed theory. Posner (1976) and Bork (1978) gave
particularly eloquent expositions of the argument which came to be associated with
the “Chicago critique” of antitrust government activity. According to these authors, in
order to induce a buyer to sign on an exclusivity contract, an incumbent firm should
compensate this buyer for the full loss he suffers from not buying from a more efficient
entrant.4 If buyers are final consumers, this loss amounts to the difference between
1They can be one-sided, in the sense that only one party to a transaction commits not to deal
with any other counterparty, or they can be reciprocal. For instance, organizers of popular sporting
events often grant one television channel exclusive broadcasting rights, an instance in which a seller
commits to sell to a single buyer. Conversely, many distribution systems are organized around exclusive
franchising, an arrangement by which a given retailer commits to distribute the product(s) of a single
manufacturer. Examples of reciprocal arrangements can be found in the advertising industry, where
agencies often win a particular firm’s total advertising budget under the agreement that they will not
take the account of one of its rivals.
2See, for instance, the 2006-2007 US Federal Trade Commission hearings on single-firm conduct.
3Two cases are often quoted in that respect. In the 1922 United Shoe Machinery Corporation case,
the Supreme Court argued that certain features of the leases used by that manufacturer prevented
shoe makers from leasing rival machines. In the 1951 Lorain Journal case, the only newspaper in
Lorain, Ohio decided to refuse advertisements from firms that were simultaneously advertising on
a radio station in nearby Elyria. The Court found those conducts illegal, being exclusionary and
non-beneficial to consumers.
4There is no welfare loss from exclusion and the whole issue is moot if the potential entrant is less
efficient than the incumbent (e.g. produces at a higher cost).
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consumer surplus under entry and under monopoly. It comprises the monopoly rent
and the usual deadweight loss. Hence, even by offering to give up all its rent, a mo-
nopolist is not able to compensate consumers fully. Therefore, deterring entry is not
a feasible policy and exclusivity contracts, if observed, must be based on some other
motivations, typically some efficiency considerations. As a consequence, competition
authorities should not worry about their use.
The Chicago critique forced industrial economists into reconsidering their theories.5
In the past twenty years, a flurry of contributions addressed the possibility of vertical
foreclosure or entry deterrence through the use of vertical arrangements. There is now
a vast literature available on this topic.6 Early on, researchers explored two different
routes, one concerned with the possible anti-competitive effect of vertical mergers on
existing rivals, the other one concerned with the deterrence of a potential rival’s entry by
an incumbent through the use of vertical arrangements, especially exclusivity contracts.
This paper takes the second route, the one leading to entry deterrence via exclusivity
contracts.7 The work on such contracts is associated with Rasmusen, Ramseyer and
Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000).8 In their common set-up, a potential
entrant needs to generate enough revenues in order to cover its entry cost, which requires
to serve a minimum number of consumers. The existence of this minimum viable scale
creates scope for entry deterrence, as one consumer’s agreement to buy only from the
incumbent exerts an externality on all the other consumers by making the entry of
the more efficient rival more difficult. By exploiting this externality, the incumbent,
who moves first by offering exclusivity contracts to consumers, is able to prevent entry.
Indeed, if all consumers sign up, a unilateral deviation by one consumer will not prove
sufficient to induce entry, so that this consumer has no incentive not to sign up as well.
Recently, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) have cast doubt on the validity of this line
of reasoning by studying the case where the purchasers of the incumbent’s product
are retailers rather than final consumers, as previously assumed.9 They show that, in
this case, competition between retailers powerfully disturbs the incumbent’s deterrence
scheme. In effect, competition between retailers introduces an additional externality
5Indeed, rather than delivering definitive conclusions, the Chicago critique can be seen primarily
as a “very helpful clarifying framework”. See Farrell (2005).
6Excellent discussions are found in Bernheim and Whinston (1999) and Rey and Tirole (2006).
7The first route, vertical foreclosure by way of merging, now comprises numerous bifurcations but
two popular destinations are associated with the pioneering contributions of Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990). The distinction between the two routes is somewhat artifical. For
instance, Spector (2007) extends the naked exclusion story to the case where the incumbent tries to
evict a rival already present on the market through exclusive dealing contracts.
8See also the early contribution of Aghion and Bolton (1987). In their model, contracts may be
breached provided compensation is paid. Exclusivity contracts help the incumbent preserve its rent
but entry typically occurs in equilibrium.
9In a precursory version of their 2007 paper, Simpson and Wickelgren (2001) were the first to
introduce competing retailers into the general model but they then departed from Segal and Whinston
(2000) on other accounts as well. In the first variation of their model, the entrant is initially inefficient
and needs to benefit from some “learning by doing”. In the second variation of their model, the
incumbent is allowed to make offers that are contingent on entry (that include, for instance, price
matching guarantees). Those additional assumptions facilitate the anticompetitive use of exclusivity
contracts.
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across them. A retailer’s signing on an exclusivity contract indeed gives the other
retailers an additional incentive not to sign and instead market the entrant’s product
(as they will face less competition in selling it). As a result, first, every retailer becomes
pivotal because the demand from only one of them, who can capture the entire market
if it buys from the more efficient entrant, proves sufficient to make entry profitable.
Second, because of the existence of fixed costs in the retail sector, a retailer anticipates
big profits when unilaterally deviating from the incumbent’s exclusivity scheme (for
the other retailers will choose to close down). That forces the incumbent to pay high
upfront fees to retailers as part of the initial contracting phase, to the point where the
deterrence scheme becomes prohibitively costly.
Subsequent research has shown that the results of Fumagalli and Motta are not
general but depend instead upon the assumptions made about the structure of the
retail sector or the legal environment. Abito and Wright (2008) extend Fumagalli and
Motta (2006) by considering the case where the downstream firms imperfectly compete
with each other. They prove that, provided those firms are not too differentiated or
provided upstream firms can use two-part tariffs, exclusive dealing by the incumbent
forecloses the entry of a more cost-efficient rival. The difference stems from the fact
that with product differentiation, retailers make positive profits and remain active in
all configurations. Thus, in the crucial subgame when a retailer deviates from the
exclusivity scheme and buy from the efficient entrant, it can capture a large chunk
of the market, just as previously, but it cannot make monopoly profits because of the
competitive pressure exerted by the incumbent’s contractor. As a result, the incumbent
needs only offer a small fee to induce retailers to sign on the exclusivity contract.
In addition, Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) show that in the case of intense retail
competition the possibility for downstream firms to breach the exclusivity contracts and
pay expectation damages, as is established law in many jurisdictions, can lead to an
outcome which they claim amounts to monopolization, even in the absence of any scale
economies.10 The reason is that a breaching retailer has to pay expectation damages
and that those damages depend on the price that would have been effectively charged
by the incumbent absent the breach. Even if the incumbent expects subsequent breach,
in order to maximize those damages, he has an incentive not to lower the (upstream)
price charged to contract-bound retailers. Therefore, there is no competitive pressure
on the breaching retailer to lower the (downstream) price: he will charge the monopoly
price, collect the monopoly profit and pay it back to the incumbent under the form of
damages.
So far, the discussion has been conducted under the hypothesis that the upstream
firms produce a homogenous product.11 The present study adds to the (theoretical)
10As a matter of fact, in the first class of equilibria in their Proposition 2, as well as in their
Proposition 3, the more efficient rival enters, all retailers sign on the exclusivity offers, exactly one of
them breaches the contract and buys from the entrant but it charges the monopoly price. Thus, entry
does occur but the incumbent’s profits and the downstream allocative inefficiency are the same as if it
did not. The mechanism is reminiscent of Aghion and Bolton (1987).
11To my knowledge, the only prominent article discussing vertical foreclosure in the case of differ-
entiated upstream goods is Ma (1997). Yet, the author assumes a particular downstream structure
since the retailers sell so-called option contracts to the final consumers, who, for a fixed fee, purchase
the possibility to buy one of the two goods (of their choice) at pre-specified prices at some time in the
4
evidence that inefficient exclusion may be the natural outcome of exclusive dealing
under intense retail competition by considering the case where the upstream firms sell
vertically differentiated products. This case is particularly important, for in many
instances a competitor will try to challenge an incumbent’s market position not by
developing a cost advantage but instead by developing a superior product. If this
business strategy can be deterred, it is the very pace of innovation in a particular
sector that is under threat, as was well-recognized in the first US Microsoft case (1995
consent decree and subsequent litigation).
If consumers were homogenous, in that they all equated a given increase in quality
with the same decrease in price, the analysis of Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) could
be readily extended to the case where the potential entrant has got a quality advantage
rather than a cost advantage over the incumbent. Things are less obvious in the case
where consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality.
In a model that combines uptream vertical differentiation, consumer heterogeneity,
non-breachable contracts and the absence of fixed costs for retailers, I show that intense
retail competition helps the incumbent preempt the entry of its rival (in that it does
not have to rely on a coordination failure on the part of buyers, as in the absence of
retail competition).12 In this model, retailers are ex ante homogenous. It is the set
of vertical arrangements that endogenously makes them different in the eyes of final
consumers through their product offerings. As in Abito and Wright (2008), the intu-
ition for the result relies on the fact that upon entry, because of differentiation, the
incumbent’s inferior product is not eliminated from the market. This has two conse-
quences that sharply contrast with the homogenous-product case. First, the potential
entrant cannot capture all the efficiency gains associated with the introduction of its
superior product. Second, in the situation where one retailer deviates from the exclu-
sivity scheme, the incumbent’s survival is not at stake. Both facts decrease the cost of
the deterrence scheme to the incumbent, to the point where it becomes implementable
with simultaneous, identical exclusivity offers.
Crucially, my result extends to the case where upstream firms are allowed to use two-
part tariffs. It is also in that case that the exclusion mechanism can be the most clearly
observed. All that matters for exclusion is that the reservation payment demanded by
a retailer for signing on the contract be low. That reservation payment is given by the
profit made by a retailer in the crucial subgame where all retailers but he have signed up
(that is, by the “deviation profit”). In turn, that is determined by the decrease in the
incumbent’s profit in that subgame. If there is harsh retail competition, the incumbent
continues reaching a good fraction of final consumers through contract-bound retailers
and so does not need to offer the “free” retailer an attractive tariff. As a result, the
future. Stenneck (2006) looks at the role of quality in exclusive distribution agreements but his focus
is not on foreclosure. Indeed, there is a single upstream firm in his bargaining model. Fumagalli and
Motta (2002) use a (horizontal) differentiation parameter as a proxy for the intensity of competition
at the downstream level, as do Abito and Wright (2008).
12As noted by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) in their footnote 6, Fumagalli and Motta (2006)
mentioned the possibility for intense downstream competition to facilitate exclusion if it had the
feature of squeezing a retailer’s profit when deviating from a candidate exclusion equilibrium. They
discounted that possibility by stating however that “in most circumstances strong enough downstream
competition makes it profitable to reject the exclusive contract.”
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entrant, who has all market power, cannot help with using a pricing scheme that leaves
that “free” retailer with little profit. As a matter of fact, in that crucial subgame, the
equilibrium is played in mixed strategies and takes the form of a stochastic “bidding
war” between the two upstream firms that is worth of separate interest. In any case,
in equilibrium, the incumbent is thus always able to convince all retailers to sign up by
making a suitable upfront payment. In contrast, if there is little competition between
retailers, the incumbent is at risk of having its product discontinued by the “free”
retailer and so of being shut out of a good part of the market. He is then compelled to
offer the “free” retailer attractive financial terms. On that ground, though, the entrant,
whose superior product generates more revenues, can match any offer, allowing for
entry equilibria. Therefore, in the case of differentiated products, retail competition,
by creating the expectation of low post-entry profits for a retailer tempted not to sign
on the exclusivity contract, is responsible for exclusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the game. Section
3 is devoted to the linear-pricing case. In turn, I study the situation when the two
products are sold by independent retail monopolists and when there is Bertrand com-
petition at the retail level. Section 4 is concerned with the case where producers are
allowed to use two-part tariffs. Section 5 offers a discussion of the results. Technicalities
are relegated to two appendices at the end of the paper.
2 Model
In this paper, I consider four variations of a basic game, depending on whether upstream
firms use linear or two-part tariffs and whether downstream firms compete with each
other in prices or do not compete at all.
I look at an industry in which products are vertically differentiated. The industry is
characterized by the presence of two downstream firms (retailers), labelled 1 and 2, and
two upstream firms (producers), I (for incumbent) and E (for entrant). The incumbent
upstream firm, I, produces a good of quality qI at constant unit cost cI and sells it to
retailer j at unit price wjI (along with a fixed fee φ
j
I in the two-part tariff variation) for
j = 1, 2. The rival in the upstream segment, E, has the option of entering the market
and selling its product of quality qE ≥ qI to retailers for a price wE (along with a fixed
fee φE in the two-part tariff variation). Doing so would entail the expense of a fixed
and unrecoverable amount F > 0, as well as per-unit production costs equal to cE.
Choosing not to enter the market would bring E zero profit.
The two upstream firms cannot sell their products directly to final consumers. For
simplicity, the retailers are assumed to buy and resell the goods at no cost. In turn,
I examine two polar structures for the downstream segment. In the first variation,
the retailers are local monopolists, each serving (a random) half of the population of
consumers. In the second variation, the retailers compete à la Bertrand for the entire
population of consumers. The level of F is assumed to be such that E needs to sell to
both local monopolists in order to find it profitable to enter. This assumption will be
made precise for the linear-pricing and two-part-tariff variations in equations (A1) and
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(A2) below, respectively.13
There is a unit mass of consumers indexed by θ and uniformly distributed over
[0, 1]. Consumers value the first unit consumed only. A consumer θ who buys one unit
of quality qi at price pi derives utility
U (qi, pi; θ) = θqi − pi. (1)
The utility from not consuming the good is set to zero. Observe that the type θ of a
consumer stands for his willingness to pay for quality at the margin.
Players are engaged in an extensive-form game of complete information that allows
the incumbent to offer retailers exclusivity contracts before the potential entrant can
make its decision. An exclusivity contract commits the retailer to purchase only from
the incumbent but does not constrain the latter’s behavior.14
The timing of the game is as follows. At time t0, I offers retailers identical exclusivity
contracts in exchange for his payment of a sum y ≥ 0, and retailers simultaneously
decide to accept or not.15
At time t1, the actions previously taken are observed by all players. The distinctive
feature of the history of play at this stage is the number S of retailers who have signed
on an exclusivity contract, where S can take the values 0, 1, or 2. E then decides on
entry.
At time t2, the action taken by E is observed by all players. In addition to S, a
distinctive feature of the history of play at that stage is the number N of upstream
firms that are active on the market, where N can take the values 1 or 2. Active
firms simultaneously name their price (or, in the two-part tariff variation, their price
schedule). As in Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Fumagalli and Motta
(2006), I is allowed to discriminate between the two retailers only in the case when one
has signed an exclusivity contract and the other has not. Thus, only in subgames where






I in the two-part tariff variation). E can only
sell her product to those retailers who have not signed an exclusivity contract with I
(that is, exclusivity contracts are perfectly enforced16) and is constrained to charge the
same price wE to them.
13Just as in Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), the problem is interesting only if the fixed cost
lies in some intermediate range. If the barriers to entry are too low, then exclusion is never achievable;
if they are too high, then entry is never profitable.
14That is, exclusivity goes one-way only and I is free to continue selling its product to the other
retailer.
15Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000), Fumagalli and Motta (2006)
and Abito and Wright (2008) study variations of the game where the incumbent is allowed to make
retailers simultaneous yet different offers, or sequential offers. In those papers, the case of simultaneous,
identical offers is the less favorable to exclusion. I focus on it in this study so as to set as hard a task
as possible for the incumbent. Exclusion results extend to the cases of discriminatory or sequential
offers.
16As Simpson and Wicklegren (2007) observe, it is often legal to breach contracts and pay damages
so that this assumption is unlikely to apply generally. Notice, however, that the model stylizes a
configuration where in vertical relationships all bargaining power is held by the upstream firms. Rep-
utational considerations or large legal costs may be an issue for retailers put in that position, so that
the assumption that contracts can be costlessly breached against the payment of expectation damages
is unlikely to apply generally either.
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At time t3, the retailers simultaneously choose the product(s) they offer for sale and
name their prices.17 In the local-monopolist variation, the retailers do so independently
on each other. In the Bertrand variation, the retailers compete in prices for final
consumers. They are committed to serve the demand adressed to them at the posted
prices, and to order the corresponding inputs. In case both retailers charge the same
price for the same product, I assume that all consumers patronize the firm with the
strictly lower marginal cost. If the retailers face the same marginal input cost, then a
fair coin toss determines which one all consumers buy from.18
For each variant of the model, I look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Observe that the model is as close as possible to the one studied by Fumagalli and
Motta (2006). Indeed, with our notation and disregarding the issue of the existence of
infinitesimal fixed costs for retailers, their model obtains when qI = qE = 1 and cI >
cE = 0.
19 Because products are homogenous in their specification, efficiency dictates
that firm I, which is cost-inefficient, be shut down (provided E’s fixed cost is not too
large). In order to replicate that necessary feature in the simplest differentiated-product
setting, I further restrict attention to the case where cI = cE = 0 and qE > qI > 0.
In this configuration, E’s product is unambiguously superior to I’s product: if both
products were offered at their true resource cost, all consumers would choose to buy qE
and firm I would shut down.20
Notice that if there were no retailers and the two producers were allowed to compete
in prices for the direct patronage of final consumers, the game would correspond to what
I will refer to as the “standard model of vertical differentiation.”21 As it will be used
17The assumption is that retailers choose the mix of products put on their shelves and their prices at
the same time; they cannot commit themselves to carry a particular mix. This assumption captures the
idea that retailers can easily change their offerings and is consistent with the produce-to-order nature
of Bertrand competition. It is new in this literature, as previous papers, dealing with a homogeneous
upstream good, did not have to worry about retailers’ product mix.
18These assumptions are made to avoid the non-existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand equilibrium
in the retailing subgame. It is well-known that if prices were chosen on a finite grid, as is realistic,
the outcome in the case when the two firms have different marginal costs would be similar to the one
assumed here.
19In Fumagalli and Motta (2006), retailers incur a fixed cost for being active and have to make a
separate decision about entry. This has the advantage of eliminating equilibrium multiplicity in some
instances but is not innocuous in their model, as they discuss in Section III of their article and as
shown in Abito and Wright (2008). In particular, it gives a retailer buying from the efficient producer
the possibility to charge the monopoly price by ruling out the presence of a firm making no sales but
driving prices down. For the sames reasons as the ones explained in Abito and Wright (2008, p. 7)
and acknowledged by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007, p. 1307), this assumption would not play a
role in our model where, because of product differentiation,a retailer always makes positive sales in all
subgames.
20When price is set at marginal cost (here, zero), the rise in consumer surplus from the introduction
of E’s product is given by (qE − qI) /2. As long as F is below that level, E’s product should be
introduced by a social planner seeking to maximize total surplus. This will always be true under the
different assumptions (A1 and A2) which we later make about the size of the sunk cost.
21This model was introduced by Gabzsewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). It
was popularized by Tirole (1988) who specified simple preferences à la Mussa and Rosen (1978). It
was used in the specific form under which it appears in the present study by Ronnen (1991) and solved
in a slightly more general form by Wauthy (1996). Most of those articles study the choice of qualities
by producers. Keep in mind that in our model qualities are exogenously given.
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repeatedly in what follows, I describe it in Appendix A for reference.
3 Linear pricing
Suppose that the upstream firms choose a unit price for their product. I first look
at the benchmark case when the market is divided in two separate submarkets, each
served by one retailer, so that there is no strategic interaction between 1 and 2. I then
consider the game where both retailers compete in the entire market. As indicated in
Section 2, I make the assumption that in the first case, serving only one local market
is not sufficient for E to cover its entry cost, F , while serving both markets is. In the














(qE − qI) . (A1)
I show that whereas coordination problems lead to the co-existence of both exclusion
and non-exclusion equilibria in the case of independent monopolists, exclusion is always
achieved (at no cost) when retailers compete.
3.1 No competition in the downstream market
Suppose first that 1 and 2 are local retail monopolists in two separate submarkets, each
serving (a randomly drawn) half of the population of consumers. I solve the game by
backward induction. Proposition 2 establishes the co-existence of both exclusion and
non-exclusion equilibria.
3.1.1 Retailer’s choice
At time t3, a retailer’s problem depends on its contractual obligations. Given the input
prices, wI and wE, a retailer who has signed on the exclusivity clause (a “bound”
retailer) will charge the monopoly price (qI + wI)/2 for the only good it is allowed to
market. A retailer who has not signed on the exclusivity clause (a “free” retailer) can
choose to sell either product or both (or none) of them. In the following proposition,
we characterize its product selection choice. It happens to be efficient, given the input
costs. That is, a “free” monopolist will make the same product selection choice as the
one a central planner would make if wI and wE were the true resource costs. This is
intuitive: the monopolist wants to extract as much surplus as possible from consumers
and so has an incentive to introduce the efficient product mix in order to raise their
willingness to pay. However, unlike a benevolent social planner, the monopolist will
charge the monopoly prices (qi + wi)/2 in all configurations.
22
22For the sake of expositional convenience, we abstract in the following proposition from the pos-
sibility that wI or wE is so high that the retailer cannot make a profit by selling the corresponding
product. In addition, every time an inequality is weak, the retailer is indifferent between different
courses of action; we always resolve the uncertainty in favor of the entrant’s product.
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, then as long as qE − wE ≥ qI − wI it markets both products. When the
inequality is reversed, it sells only I’s product. In all configurations, it charges the
monopoly price (qi + wi)/2 for the good(s) it markets.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.1.2 Upstream competition
At time t2, if E has decided not to enter (or has decided to enter in spite of both
retailers signing on the exclusivity clause), then I is de facto a monopolist in the
upstream segment. He will charge the monopoly price and each retailer will mark this
price up in a classical instance of double marginalization.
Suppose now that E has decided to enter and that a least one retailer has not
signed on the exclusivity contract. Given the “free” retail monopolist’s optimal policy,
what prices will the upstream firms charge him? Clearly, under linear pricing, it is
not possible for E to exclude I by means of limit-pricing in equilibrium. According to




, and since I’s marginal cost is
zero, either wE > 0 and I could cut its price sufficiently to reverse the inequality, or
wE = wI = 0 and E could increase profit by marginally raising its price. Therefore, in
equilibrium, both products must be sold by the “free” retailer.
The upstream firms thus anticipate that they play a game analogous to the standard
model of vertical differentiation, with the difference that, because of double marginal-
ization (and the linearity of demand), they end up selling only half the quantities that
would have been demanded by final consumers, had those been directly charged the
input prices. Because the payoff functions are only rescaled, the game has the same
equilibrium as the standard model: firm E, whose product is of superior quality, charges
a higher price than firm I and captures most of the market.
3.1.3 Contracting
At time t0, given our assumption about the size of F , the crucial issue is the possibility
for I to induce one retailer to sign on an exclusivity contract. Yet, the incumbent is
here constrained to make identical offers to both retailers. By symmetry, the question
hence becomes whether on a given submarket the increase in I’s profit brought about
by the suppression of the competition from E can compensate for the decrease in
the retailer’ profits. Under the maintained hypothesis that E enters the market, the
answer is no, as argued by the proponents of the Chicago critique. Indeed, because
I is unable to extract all the surplus from consumers, his monopoly rents are smaller
than the decrease in the retailer’s profits following the disappearance of E’s product.
(In a sense, the argument is even compounded by product differentiation because, in
addition to the usual price increase, top consumers now get the "wrong" product under
I’s monopoly, which considerably decreases their willingness to pay.)
Thus, if retailer j is convinced that E will enter, there is no compensation y that I
can rationally offer to induce him to accept the exclusivity contract. As a consequence,
a strategy profile in which no retailer signs on and E enters can be an equilibrium.
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On the other hand, we have assumed with (A1) that serving only one local market
was not sufficient for E to cover its fixed cost, F , unlike serving both. Therefore, if
retailer j anticipates the other retailer to sign on, he has no reason not to accept the
contract as well, as not doing so would not induce E to enter anyway.
So, two types of equilibria co-exist: equilibria in which neither retailer signs up,
and equilibria in which both retailers sign up. I is able to exclude E only by taking
advantage of a coordination failure between the two retailers. The logic is identical to
the one in Proposition 1 in Segal and Whinston (2000).
Proposition 2 In the case where the retailers are local monopolists, each serving half
of the population of consumers, and upstream firms are constrained to use linear price
schedules, there exist both “exclusion equilibria” and “non-exclusion equilibria”.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.2 Bertrand competition in the downstream market
Suppose now that 1 and 2 compete in prices à la Bertrand in the entire market. Absent
any exclusivity arrangement, the competition between retailers will force them to charge
the price they pay for their inputs. Each will serve half of the demand for each product
and make zero profit. At the upstream level, the game played by the producers is thus
identical to standard model of vertical differentiation, since double marginalization does
no longer occur.
In order to assess the possibility of exclusion, we have to determine the outcome of
the pricing subgame where, say, 1 alone has signed the exclusivity contract and 2 is the
only potential seller of E’s product (since the outcome of this subgame determines the
reservation compensation demanded by a retailer to sign on the contract). The situation
is now asymmetric, for I, who has access to both retailers, can set the price that will
be charged to final consumers (any mark-up being eliminated through the price rivalry
between 1 and 2), whereas E’s input price will be marked up by his single retailer. As
a consequence, E’s sales are diminished. It is the case that they are diminished to such
an extent that E cannot cover its entry cost under assumption (A1). Hence, E will
not enter unless neither retailer signs up. However, this cannot happen, as I is always
able to bribe retailers into acceptance, given that they anticipate to make zero profit
following entry if they don’t sign.
We are now in the position to assert our main result: I is able to exclude at no cost.
Proposition 3 In the case when retailers compete à la Bertrand, and upstream firms
are constrained to use linear price schedules, there are only equilibria in which I excludes
E at no cost.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The equilibrium path can be described as follows: I offers both retailers to sign
up for zero compensation; at least one of them does (out of indifference); E decides
against entry; I then charges the monopoly price that is passed onto final consumers.
This result is particularly striking because exclusion is the only outcome in the setting
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that is the less favorable to the incumbent’s deterrence scheme according to the previous
literature: the case of simultaneous and non-discriminatory offers. Moreover, exclusion
is achieved at no cost to the incumbent.
This outcome is a consequence of the differentiated nature of the industry. In Fu-
magalli and Motta (2006), a retailer deviating from an exclusion candidate equilibrium
chooses to market only the entrant’s product while the other, “bound” retailer is con-
tractually obliged to market only the incumbent’s. The situation is symmetric in the
sense that each upstream firm competes in the final market through one of the two
retailers. The deviator then captures the entire market (because it buys from a cheaper
source), which is sufficient for the entrant to cover its fixed cost. In our model, it is
not in a unilateral deviator’s interests to refrain from selling I’s product. Indeed, the
“bound” retailer will market it anyway. In a classical instance of Bertrand undercut-
ting, the “free” retailer can always increase profit by selling I’ s product himself at the
same price as its rival’s or slightly below, without cannibalizing its sales of E’s superior
product. Therefore, the incumbent continues reaching final consumers through both
retailers. This introduces an asymmetry in the game that has negative consequences
on E’s sales.
It should be stressed that this result is independent on the assumption about the
existence of fixed costs in the retail sector. As Fumagalli and Motta (2006) discuss
at the end of their article, absent such costs, in the homogenous-product case, there
would be a continuum of equilibria in their model, some involving entry, some others
exclusion, depending on the price charged by the contract-bound retailer in the crucial
subgame (in which it does make any positive sale), which determines the level of profit
of the "free" retailer. As in Abito and Wright (2008), with or without espilon fixed
costs, allowing a little bit of differentiation, this time between upstream firms, provides
a way of selecting from this wealth of equilibria and indicates that costless exclusion is
the winner.
4 Two-part tariffs
Suppose now that producers are allowed to use tariffs specifying a proportional part
(with coefficient wi) along with a fixed fee, φi ≥ 0.
23 Throughout this section we
continue to make the assumption that in the local monopolists case, E would have to
sell to both retailers in order to recoup its development costs. In the present context,







I show that in the case where the market is divided between two local monopolists,
there are some equilibrium outcomes where only E’s product is distributed, and some
other where only I’s product is. By contrast, the exclusion of E is the only outcome in
the case of Bertrand competition between retailers.
23The fee is incurred only in case a strictly positive quantity is ordered.
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4.1 Local monopolists
I first consider the benchmark case where consumers are served by two local retail
monopolists. Producers have an incentive to set their price at marginal cost so as to
avoid the double-marginalization problem, and use the fixed fee to extract as much as
they can of the retailer’s profit. In this situation, abstracting from the level of the fixed
fees, a retailer would never choose to sell I’s product, in accordance with Proposition
1: if both products cost the same, it is better to go for the superior one, which raises
consumers’ willingness to pay.
I is willing to pay as much as the whole of its monopoly rents on the local market
in order to maintain its monopoly and induce the retailer to reject E’s offer. Yet,
E, whose product generates more revenue than the incumbent’s, can profitably match
this offer by decreasing its fixed fee. As a result, under the expectation that E will
enter the market, I cannot promise retailers enough money to induce them to sign on
the exclusivity contract. So there are equilibria in which neither retailer signs on the
contract and E’s product is the only one sold. This outcome makes clear that as soon
as the efficient entrant is allowed to take part in the “bidding for the right to exclude”
(something made possible here by the existence of the fixed fee), it can only win.
Yet, our assumption regarding the size of the fixed cost (A2) allows for a coordination
failure among retailers, leading to exclusion. Indeed, neither retailer feels pivotal if he
expects the other one to sign up, in which case there is no point in refusing to sign up
as well So, there is another equilibrium outcome in which E’s entry is deterred.
Proposition 4 In the case where the retailers are local monopolists, each serving half
of the population of consumers, and upstream firms offer two-part tariffs, there exist
both “exclusion equilibria” and “entry equilibria”.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As in the linear-pricing case, exclusion occurs only because of a coordination failure
between retailers. Observe that in the “entry equilibria” the active (but ultimately
unsuccessful) presence of the incumbent after entry is needed in order for E not to
engage into some opportunistic behavior that would leave the retailers with little or even
zero profit. As a matter of fact, retailers are left with the equivalent of I’s monopoly
rents. As has been noted by previous authors, if the incumbent could instead commit
to withdraw upon entry (or more generally could commit to policies that are contingent
on E’s presence or absence), exclusion would be the unique outcome.
4.2 Bertrand competition
When the retailers compete for the entire population of consumers, they cannot play one
producer against the other to the same extent as in the “entry equilibria” of the previous
proposition. Indeed, consider the subgame following the acceptance of the contract by
retailer 1 only and E’s entry. The situation is inherently unstable; as a matter of fact,
there does not exist any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason is that I can
always choose to distribute its product through the “bound” retailer (disregarding the
other one), so that he is always guaranteed the profit he would make in the standard
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model. As a consequence, the previous outcome where both producers “bid” for the
right to sell through retailer 2 (by decreasing their fixed fee), a race that can only
be lost by I, whose product generates less revenues, cannot be an equilibrium here.
Yet, the symmetric configuration in which each producer sells its product through one
retailer and cashes the standard model profits cannot be an equilibrium either. Indeed,
the temptation for I to bribe 2 into distributing its product instead of E’s is always
present: if I chose to distribute its product through the “bound” retailer” only, then E
would choose to extract all the profit from the “free” retailer, and I could then profitably
deviate by offering the latter any strictly positive share of its monopoly rents.
There exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium, which can be informally described as
follows. With respective probabilities α and β, I and E play in a way that reproduces
the outcome of the standard model of vertical differentiation. That is, I sells its product
to 1 at zero marginal cost (and makes a prohibitive offer to 2), while E sells its product
to 2 at zero marginal cost. Both charge a fixed fee equal to their respective standard
duopoly profit and repatriate all the producer surplus at their level. With probability
1− α, I decides to make a random bid to establish 2 as a retail monopolist marketing
only qI . With probability 1 − β, E makes a random counter-offer to have 2 sell only
qE. In equilibrium, I is held down to his minimal payoff (the standard duopoly profit).
Importantly, 2 is left with less than I’s monopoly rents in expectation.24
This is strikingly different from the case of homogenous products. In that case, in
the subgame following the acceptance of the contract by 1 and E’s entry, I has no choice
but to enter into a bidding war for the access to the “free” retailer’s services. Indeed, if
the latter chooses to sell E’s product, then E captures the entire market. It is therefore
a matter of survival for I to try to induce 2 not to carry qE by leaving him as much
profit as possible. In equilibrium, I promises 2 the whole of its monopoly rents (by
charging no fixed fee) but this offer is matched by E. Thus, a retailer deviating from
an exclusion equilibrium candidate by refusing the exclusivity clause can always secure
that amount. In these circumstances, there is no compensation that I can rationally
promise so as to have 2 sign on the contract, as the former’s willingness to pay is
precisely equal to its monopoly rents. Therefore, exclusion is not feasible.
In contrast, in the case of differentiated products, 2 receives much less than the
monopoly rents, if only because some of the time producers manage to reproduce the
outcome of the standard duopoly model and extract all the retailers’ profits. It is thus
intuitive that I could exclude E if it were allowed to make discriminatory or sequential
offers to the retailers (for such offers constrain the incumbent to pay a positive com-
pensation to at most one of the two retailers). I show that, even when I is constrained
to make simultaneous, identical offers, he can compensate both retailers sufficiently to
have them sign on the contract.
24We fully charaterize the cumulative distribution functions used by the producers in the proof of
Proposition 5. This mixed-strategy equilibrium is not unique. Indeed, there is a whole continuum of
mixed-strategy profiles leading to the same outcome. We do believe, although we do not prove, that
this outcome is unique. In any case, it is the most favorable to the entrant because it is the one in
which I is held down to its minmax payoff, which means that its “willingness to bribe 2” and induce
him to reject the offer by E is maximal. That, in turn, ensures that a retailer’s reservation payment
for signing on the contract (and so the cost of the deterrence scheme) is maximal.
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We therefore have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the case where the retailers compete à la Bertrand, and upstream
firms offer two-part tariffs, I excludes E in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
So, exclusion is not driven by the double marginalization problem that arises when
a product is sold through two successive price-setters, a problem that does not arise
with two-part tariffs. That problem was responsible for the fact that I could exclude
at no cost in the linear-tariff case, not for exclusion per se. In addition, observe that
the arguments above are again independent on the (non-)existence of retail fixed costs,
as acknowledged by Fumagalli and Motta (2006) themselves.25
This said, observe that if the potential entrant could compete with the incumbent
at time t0, or promise to extract less surplus upon entry, it could profitably enter the
market. In truth, inefficient exclusion is generated by the entrant’s inability to commit
to share part of its profit, not by the nature of pricing. The incumbent’s only advantage
is that, through the exclusivity contracts, it can commit to rebate some profit to the
downstream firms.
5 Discussion
I have shown in this paper that, when upstream products exhibit any level of vertical
differentiation, intense (i.e. Bertrand) downstream competition makes it easier for an
incumbent producer to use long-term exclusivity contracts so as to prevent a clearly
superior product from being introduced, as this incument does not have to rely on a
coordination failure on the part of retailers (as is the case in the absence of retail com-
petition). Indeed, under linear pricing, if one retailer signs on the contract but the other
doesn’t, the demand addressed to the incumbent upon entry is reduced but continues
to be positive, as products are differentiated. Yet, the situation is not symmetric as the
incumbent, whose product continues to be marketed by both retailers, does not suffer
from double marginalization. The incumbent thus captures a higher share of the mar-
ket than otherwise. The entrant’s diminished sales then prove insufficient to allow it to
recover its development costs so that exclusion is achieved at no cost to the incumbent.
Under two-part tariffs, the potential entrant finds it profitable to enter even if only
one retailer has signed on. However, the “free” retailer cannot hope for the entrant to
leave him with the equivalent of the incumbent’s monopoly rents, because product dif-
ferentiation dampens the “bidding war” between producers. As a result, the incumbent
is able to bribe that retailer into signing on the exclusivity clause as well.
I now comment on the robustness and implications of my results, examining in turn
(i) market structure, (ii) the nature of product differentiation and (iii) the nature of
contractual arrangements, before drawing some (tentative) policy lessons.
(i) In my model, the general argument obviously relies on the fact that the down-
stream segment structure is fixed. If entry was easy at this level, either by upstream
25On page 793, first column and footnote 16.
15
firms or independent retailers, exclusion would not be possible. Thus, it must be the
case that there exist barriers to entry both at the production and the retail level.
The argument also relies on the fact that the incumbent’s product continues to be
sold after entry. This feature might not extend to those cases where vertical differ-
entiation is very large and marginal costs are different from zero, as the seller of the
high-quality product might engage in limit-pricing and price the incumbent out of the
market in equilibrium. In those circumstances, the incumbent would have to fight for
survival following entry and a deviating retailer would be able to extract the equivalent
of the incumbent’s rents from the entrant. As a result, Fumagalli and Motta (2006)’s
argument woud be restored. Yet, limit-pricing is not sustainable when the products are
sufficiently similar and the spirit of our results is preserved as long as the quality dif-
ferential is moderate in comparison to the cost differential. I stress that, in my model,
exclusion obtains under Bertrand competition at the retail level for any level of product
differentiation, however small.
As repeatedly stressed, the general argument does not depend on our assumption
that there are no fixed costs for retailers. All results can be obtained with epsilon fixed
costs. The reason is that in the crucial subgame when one retailer is contract-bound
and the other free, both retailers make strictly positive sales. Thus, the presence of
small fixed costs would have no impact on their behavior.
Although I have only reported results about the polar cases of inexistent or Bertrand
retail competition, I speculate that there is a level of downstream competition above
which exclusion ceases to be dependent on miscoordination among retailers and becomes
the unique equilibrium outcome. Indeed, retail market power allows a retailer to elicit
a bidding war from the two producers for the right to reach his “captive” consumers,
whereas retail competition facilitates the incumbent’s survival. As a result, a deviating
retailer’s post-entry profit, its reservation payment for signing on the exclusivity clause,
decreases with competition.
One could wonder what would happen in the plausible case where the potential
entrant were allowed to offer the same product as the incumbent’s (without incurring
any development cost) alongside the superior product. It can be shown that exclusion
of that latter product continues to be the only equilibrium outcome under Bertrand
competition at the retail level if, as in my model, the entrant makes a separate decision
in time t1 about product selection (and can therefore commit not to introduce both
products). In that case, it never wants to jeopardize its sales of the superior product
by carrying the inferior one. As a result, when one retailer deviates from the exclusion
scheme, the incumbent continues to be guaranteed the standard duopoly profit and the
remainder of argument is unchanged.
(ii) My result concerns vertically differentiated products, but a version of it should
carry over to the case of horizontal product differentiation. Indeed, the crux of the
argument, that the expected profit of a retailer considering no to sign on the contract is
smaller than the incumbent’s monopoly rent, depends only on the incumbent’s survival
not being at stake following entry, a feature of any differentiated product oligopoly.
One reason for focusing on vertical differentiation is that the introduction of a higher
quality by the entrant can be interpreted as the result of technical innovation. In
that respect, my model have implications for technological change (and its repression).
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Indeed, in my setting, once a product that might be improved upon has been brought
to the market, the first order of business for its producer is to engage into long-term
exclusivity relationships with retailers. Indeed, this might prove sufficient to deter any
rival innovator from investing into the development of a superior product (over the
length of the contracts).
(iii) The model is concerned with explicit exclusivity clauses. Yet, in practice, as
is well-recognized, exclusivity can be achieved not only by means of signing a contract
explicitely written for that purpose but also by including clauses (e.g. high termination
fees, quantity forcing, quantity rebates or loyalty rebates) that induce a signer to make
decisions that give rise to the same outcome.
Thus, the fact that downstream markets are highly competitive should not lead
antitrust practitioners to dismiss claims that vertical restraints threaten the competi-
tive structure of an industry. No safe harbor test can be based on the level of retail
competition as it would lead to a worrying amount of false negatives in cases in which
products are differentiated. Instead, as made clear by Bernheim and Whinston (1998)
and illustrated by Abito and Wright (2008), exclusion is feasible and detrimental every
time entry is efficient and leads to a decrease of the incumbent’s and the buyers’ joint
surplus. Assessing whether those conditions hold require a post-entry model of the
market, or more precisely, an estimate of the expected profit to a deviating retailer.
This said, it is worth emphasizing that my model does not provide any reason for
the existence of such contracts but the exclusion motive. Hence, even if this estimate
were available and low, this study should not be interpreted as indicating that long-
term vertical arrangements are likely to arise from anti-competitive behavior. They
might or they might not. Even if they do, the detrimental consequences might well
be counter-balanced by some other (efficiency) considerations. In the end, a careful
examination of the exact nature of competition in the industry is the only path to a
proper assessment of these practices.
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A The standard model of vertical product differen-
tiation
I consider an industry in which two firms produce vertically differentiated products.
For the sake of concreteness, the firms are labelled I and E but bear in mind that
in the proofs given in Appendix B this model applies to the subgame where retailers
compete with each other and are supplied at (zero) marginal cost. Firm i produces
a good of quality qi at zero cost, i ∈ {I, E}. We have that qE > qI > 0. (E is the
high-quality producer.) The two firms compete à la Bertrand for the patronage of
consumers. Without loss of generality, the strategy space of firm i is taken to be [0, qi].
There is a unit mass of consumers indexed by θ and uniformly distributed over
[0, 1]. Consumers value the first unit consumed only. A consumer θ who buys one unit
of quality qi at price pi derives utility
U (qi, pi; θ) = θqi − pi. (2)
The utility from not consuming the good is set to zero. Consumers make their purchase
decision after observing the prices posted by the firms.
Given two prices pE and pI , we denote by the θ̂ the consumer who derives the same





We denote by θ̃i the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing firm i’s product























⇐⇒ θ̂ < θ̃E < θ̃I
. (5)
Thus, there is demand for product qI if and only if its hedonic price is smaller than the
hedonic price for qE.
A.1 E’s best-response






If firm E prices below a, then it becomes a monopolist. The monopoly price is given

















If firm E prices above a, then it faces competition from firm I. On the real line its
program is strictly concave. The sufficient first-order condition gives
pE =
pI + qE − qI
2
. (8)










pI + qE − qI
2
≥ a⇐⇒ pI ≤
qI (qE − qI)
2qE − qI
. (9)
This treshold is always smaller than the one above applying to BR−E.
Therefore, disregarding the bounds of the domain for pI , firm E’s best-response

























Consider now firm I’s situation, given pE. We introduce the price b for which θ̂ = 1.
That is,
b = pE − (qE − qI) . (11)
If firm I prices below b, it becomes a monopolist. The monopoly price is given by









pE is sufficiently low, then b can turn negative. So, in all rigor, we should write b =
max {0, pE − (qE − qI)}.) Observe that
qI
2
≤ b⇐⇒ pE ≥
qI
2
+ (qE − qI) . (12)
If firm I prices above b, then it faces competition from firm E. The necessary and























≥ b⇐⇒ pI ≤
2qE (qE − qI)
2qE − qI
. (14)
This treshold is always smaller than the one above applying to BR−2 , for
qI
2
+ (qE − qI)−





2 (2qE − qI)
. (15)
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Therefore, disregarding the bounds of the domain for pE, firm I’s best-response
























+ (qE − qI)
. (16)
A.3 Nash equilibrium
It is now a matter of cheking that the two best-response graphes intersect only once,
on their first segment. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium. Solving for the inter-
section:
p∗E =




qI (qE − qI)
4qE − qI
. (18)










To facilitate the exposition, in the following proofs, starred variables refer to equilibrium
prices, quantities or profits of the standard model of vertical differentiation described
in Appendix A.










long as qE −wE > qI −wI it markets both products. When the inequality is reversed, it
sells only I’s product. In all configurations, it charges the monopoly prices (qi + wi)/2
for the good(s) it markets.
Assume that the prices charged by I and E are smaller than the willingness to pay
of the consumer with the highest valuation. That is, wi < qi for i = 1, 2. We now
consider the profitability of the different product mix options. Suppose firstly that
local monopolist j markets only one of the two goods. We denote the last consumer
































So marketing E’s product only to I’s product only is preferable if and only if




(qI − wI) . (24)
Suppose secondly that j sells positive quantities of both products. There is a con-





















































This set of prices maximizes profit (under the constraint that both products are
marketed) only if the so-called hedonic price for the high-quality product (i.e. the
price per unit of quality) is higher than the hedonic price for the low-quality product.















Suppose now that condition (30) is violated. There are two cases.





. In that case, both the unit margin and the volumes are higher when selling
qE.
(ii) wI < wE ≤ wI
qE
qI
, in which case we have that










(qI − wI) , (32)
since qE/qI > 1 by assumption. Thus, selling qE is preferable. We conclude that when
inequality (30) is reversed, selling E’s product only is then an optimal policy.
Suppose now that condition (30) holds. If j markets both products, then the prices
are the same as when it sells only one of them. As a result, the mass of consumers served
by the firm is the same as when it sells only I’s product. Yet, it charges higher prices to
the top consumers. "Cannibalization" does occur: a fraction θ̂ − θ̃E of consumers who
would have bought the high-quality product at a high price if it were the only good
available switch when presented with the low-quality alternative. If qE−wE < qI −wI ,
this is good news for the monopolist as these customers will generate higher profit
margins but then, it would be preferable to have all consumers switch, and to drop
E’s product altogether. If qE − wE ≥ qI − wI , then selling both products is at least as
profitable as selling good qI only. In order to know whether good qI should be marketed
at all, one has to compare the losses due to cannibalization to the gains arising from
the additional mass of consumers θ̃E − θ̃I purchasing the low-quality good. The gains














(qI − wI) . (33)














· [(qE − wE)− (qI − wI)] . (34)
















[(qE − wE)− (qI − wI)] , (35)







which is then always satisfied. So, when qE − wE ≥ qI − wI , the gains from selling
product qI to some additional consumers always compensate for the losses incurred on
those consumers who give up on product qE. QED
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In the case where the retailers are local monopolists, each serving half of the population
of consumers, and upstream firms are constrained to use linear price schedules, there
exist both “exclusion equilibria” and “non-exclusion equilibria”.
At time t2, on a given submarket, either retailer j is “bound”, or it is “free”. Suppose









capture some of the demand, or wE = 0 and E can profit from raising his price strictly
above qE
qI
wI. Similarly, I cannot price E out. Therefore, in equilibrium, both products
















































































That is, the game is analogous to the standard model of vertical differentiation,
with the difference that, because of double marginalization, demand on this submarket
is halved. From Appendix A, we know that there is a unique equilibrium with prices
w∗E =




qI (qE − qI)
4qE − qI
. (42)




















where Di stands for the demand addressed to producer i ∈ {E, I}.










qI (5qE − 2qI)
4qE − qI
. (46)














2 (qE − qI) . (48)





















2 (4qE + 5qI)
(4qE − qI)
2 . (50)
If retailer j is “bound”, then I is a monopolist. It charges the monopoly price qI/2,










We now proceed to show that I cannot offer retailer j high enough a compensation
to induce him to sign on the contract if E is anticipated to enter. (Since I is constrained
to make identical offers, it is sufficient to focus on only one of the two local markets.)
On a given local market, the surge in I’s profits occasioned by the disappearance of





































A direct computation gives
∆πI −∆πj =
4qIqE − 4 (qE)
2 − 3 (qI)
2
32 (4qE − qI)
2 , (55)
which is negative, as qI < qE by assumption.
Given assumption (A1) and the value for π∗E, any equilibrium strategy profile must
entail the following behavioral strategy for E at time t1: enter if S = 0; do not enter if
S = 1 or S = 2.
We next show that there cannot be any equilibrium outcome involving S = 1.
Indeed, in that case, the “bound” retailer is pivotal, in the sense that his refusal to sign
up would lead to E’s entry. The maximum compensation that I can rationally offer is
y = ∆πI . Since ∆πI −∆πj < 0, it is not rational for the “bound” retailer to accept.
We now describe some strategy profiles constituting “entry equilibria”: I offers any
given compensation y in [0,∆πI ]; retailer j rejects the contract for any y < ∆πj, accepts
if y ≥ ∆πj, j = 1, 2; E enters if S = 0 and does not enter otherwise; from time t2 on,
all firms behave as in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. I has no interest in deviating since no
compensation y accepted by the retailers leads to an increase in profit. Each retailer’s
strategy is optimal given that the other retailer behaves symmetrically. In particular,
E would not enter in case j alone accepted the contract.
We finally describe strategy profiles constituting “exclusion equilibria”: I offers a
compensation y0 such that 0 ≤ y0 ≤ ∆πI ; retailer j rejects the contract for any y < y0,
accepts if y ≥ y0, j = 1, 2; E enters if S = 0 and does not enter otherwise; from time t2
on, all firms behave as in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. Again, I has no interest in deviating
since no lower y continues to trigger acceptance and a higher y would be wasted for no
cause. Each retailer’s strategy is optimal. When y ≥ y0, given that the other retailer
accepts the offer, E would not enter in case j rejected the contract. So there is no
reason to reject y0. Moreover, it should not accept any y < ∆πj when y < y0 and he is
pivotal. QED
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In the case when retailers compete à la Bertrand, and firms are constrained to use linear
price schedules, there are only equilibria in which I excludes E at no cost.
In order to assess the possibility of exclusion, we have to determine the outcome of
the pricing game when 1 alone has signed the exclusivity contract (S = 1) and 2 is the
only potential seller of E’s product. In principle, 2 then seeks to maximize

















with respect to pE and p
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I , else demand for product qI vanishes).









≡ pI . (57)
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It is then clear that at time t2 I will decide to charge the same price to both retailers:
w1I = w
2
I ≡ wI . (58)
Doing otherwise would amount to leaving a fraction of the revenues generated by its
product to the retailer being charged the lowest price. In turn, observe that it is not
possible that 2 does not carry I’s product at time t3. If it were so, then 1 would sell it
at a profit. Whatever the price it charges for E’ s product, 2 could keep it at that level
and sell I’s product at 1’s price, thereby leaving the sales of E’s product unchanged
and capturing half the sales of I’s product.
Hence, retailers do not make any profit on I’s product and the first-order condition
for 2’s program gives:
pE =


























wI + qE − qI
2
. (62)
Observe that this is exactly the same response as in the local-monopolists case. By
linearity of the demand curves, although the quantities are halved, the price decisions
remain unchanged.
Hence, the equilibrium upstream prices are unchanged:
w∗E =




qI (qE − qI)
4qE − qI
. (64)
At the downstream level, though, the outcome is different because I, who sells to both
retailers, can in practice determine the final price while E suffers from double marginal-
ization. Hence:
pE =


















So, E’s equilibrium quantity is halved, as compared to the local-monopolists case, and






(qE − qI) < F , (69)
the last inequality resulting from assumption (A1). Therefore, E will not enter unless
neither retailer signs up.
Let us now show that the following profile of strategies is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium:
a) I offers both firms exclusivity contracts in exchange of compensation y = 0; both
firms accept;
b) E enters if and only if S = 0;
c) upstream firms price according to the following table, summarizing their behavior
as a function of the number of active upstream firms, N ∈ {1, 2} (where N = 1 stands
for the case when E does not enter) and S:






















d) in all cases but S = 1, and N = 2, both retailers charge their input prices; if












The computations above showed that the strategies in c) and d) are the equilibria
in each of the corresponding subgames. We have shown that πE > F only when S = 0,
so it is optimal for E to enter if and only if S = 0.
In a), neither retailer has an incentive to refuse to sign on for any y ≥ 0, as a
unilateral deviation would not trigger E’s entry, anyway. For his part, I cannot get the
retailers to sign on for cheaper.
Consider now the strategy profile where everything is as above, except that one
retailer does not sign on. We show that it is also an equilbirium. The “free” retailer is
indifferent between signing up or not. The retailer that has signed on is also indifferent
as its deviation would trigger entry but would not affect its profit (zero in all cases).
We claim that no other strategy profile is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consider first any strategy profile in which at least one of the retailers signs on and
y > 0. Then I can decrease this amount and still induce acceptance, since the “bound”
retailer expects to make zero profit in case he deviates and E enters.
Suppose now that there is an equilibrium in which both retailers decline to sign
on for a compensation y. In the continuation equilibrium, E must enter since in the
ensuing subgame it collects enough revenue to cover its sunk cost but retailers will make
zero profit. If y = 0, then at time t0, I can deviate and raise y, triggering acceptance
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of the contracts. If y > 0, then the original strategy profile was not an equilibrum,
as retailers should have taken on the offer, given that they make zero profit following
entry. QED
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
In the case where the retailers are local monopolists, each serving half of the population
of consumers, and upstream firms offer two-part tariffs, there exist both “exclusion
equilibria” and “entry equilibria”.
At time t2, in any continuation equilibrium, active firms set wi to zero in order to
avoid double marginalization. On a local market that is open to competition, the sole
comparison of sales on this basis would lead retailer j to market E’s product only by
Proposition 1(because wI/qI would then be equal to wE/qE). To avoid being priced
out of the market, I is willing to bribe retailer j into carrying its product instead of
E’s. The best offer that I can make is to transfer the entire monopoly profit to the
retailer: qI/8. This is achieved by promising not to charge any fee. Yet, this offer can
always be matched by firm E, whose product commands higher revenues on j’s market:
qE/8. Thus, in a continuation equilibrium with S = 2, wI = 0, φI = 0, wE = 0 and
φE = (qE − qI) /8. Only qE is sold. (Should I make another, less favorable offer, then
E would best-respond by increasing φE. In turn, the resulting strategy profile would
not be an equilibrium as I could profitably deviate by decreasing its fixed and exclude
E.) We have that on one open local market, πE = φE, so that by assumption (A2) E
should enter the market at time t1 if and only if S = 0.
There exist “exclusion equilibria”, in which S = 2. If S = 2 and E does not enter,
then in the continuation equilibria at time t2, I extracts all the surplus by charging
φI = qI/8 and wI = 0 on both markets. Thus, the retailers make zero (operational)
profit at that stage. They should be willing to accept any offer bringing more profit than
y0 (whatever that is). The maximum amount that I can rebate them is its monopoly
rents: qI/8. Retailer j anticipates that in case he refuses to sign on, E will not enter
as the other local market is not open to competition, anyway. As a result, any strategy
profile where I offers y0 such that 0 ≤ y0 ≤ qI/8, retailers accept the contract as long
as y ≥ y0 but reject it otherwise, and E does not enter, is an equilibrium.
There also exist “entry equilibria” involving S = 0. Take any strategy profile where
I offers y0 such that 0 ≤ y0 ≤ qI/8, retailers refuse the contract as long as y0 < qI/8 but
accept it otherwise, and E enters. I sees no point in raising its offer because either it
does not change the set of signers or it triggers acceptance but leads to a loss. Retailers
choose not to sign because they are guaranteed qI/8 following entry, which is at least
as good as what I can offer. QED
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In the case where the retailers compete à la Bertrand, and upstream firms offer two-part
tariffs, I excludes E in equilibrium.




, wI = 0. That is, I repatriates the monopoly profit at his level.
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In the subgame where neither retailer signs on the incumbent’s offer (S = 0) and E
enters (N = 2), the outcome is the same as in the standard model of vertical differenti-
ation. Indeed, at time t3, retailers cannot refrain from carrying a given product (as long
as the unit price, or the fixed fee, is not prohibitive). If an upstream firm’s tariff does
not comprise a fixed fee, both retailers charge the input price and make zero profit on
that product. If the upstream firm charges a fixed fee, then the retailers face the same
decreasing average-cost curve. If the fixed fee is strictly smaller than the maximum
level of gross profits, then given our tie-breaking rule, there is a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies in which both firms charge the lowest price compatible with zero
profit and are randomly selected to serve the market. Unless the fixed fee equals the
maximum level of gross profits, this outcome is dominated, from the producer’s point
of view, by the policy consisting in setting the fixed fee to zero and charging its opti-
mal downstream price to both retailers. An upstream firm still faces the temptation
of bribing retailers into stopping to carry their rival’s product but in this symmetric
Bertrand retail configuration, there is no way retailers can be left with some positive
profit in equilibrium. As a result, it is not rational for E to price I out in equilibrium.
(That would require setting wE = 0.) So, the outcome of the standard vertical product
differentiation model makes for the only equilibrium. The equilibrium involves
w∗E =




qI (qE − qI)
4qE − qI
, (71)













Upstream firms make the corresponding profits while downtream firms make zero profit.












Consider now the subgame in which only 1 has signed on the exclusivity clause
(S = 1) and E has entered (N = 2). There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
The reason is that I can always choose to distribute its product through the “bound”
retailer. As a consequence, I is always guaranteed the standard duopoly profit π∗I .
The equilibrium outcome of the standard duopoly model of vertical differentiation then
makes for an obvious candidate. A corresponding strategy profile would be the one in








I = qI , and E sets φE = π
∗
E, wE = 0. Yet,
this cannot be an equilibrium, for I can always succesfully bribe 2 into rejecting E’s
offer and sharing the monopoly rents. Indeed, a deviation is profitable for I if 2 prefers
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which is always true. The only way to sustain a duopolistic equilibrium in pure strate-
gies would thus consist in guaranteeing that 2 is left with enough profit to be immune
from such deviating offers from I. Yet, E is not willing to decrease φE if I does not
make such an offer. In other words, it is not possible to construct an equilibrium in
which I is guaranteed the duopoly profit and 2 is guaranteed at least qI
4
− π∗I .
We now construct the mixed-strategy equilibrium we focus on, and derive the equi-
librium payoffs used for backwards induction.




I = 0, φ
2
I = 0, w
2
I = qI . We call this pure
(behavioral) strategy A. With probability 1 − α, I sets φ1I = 0 w
1
I = qI , w
2
I = 0, and







. Slightly abusing notation we call this mixed (behavioral) strategy Q.
With probability β, E chooses φE = π
∗
E, wE = 0. We call this pure (behavioral)
strategy B. With probability 1 − β, E sets wE = 0 and chooses φE according to a








abusing notation we call this mixed (behavioral) strategy R.
The outcome of the competition between retailers at time t3 is as follows:
• when A is played against B, 1 accepts I’s offer; 2 accepts E’s offer; the outcome
is the same as in the standard model of vertical differentiation, in which retailers
make zero profit;
• when A is played against R, 1 accepts I’s offer; 2 accepts E’s offer; the prices
are the same in the standard duopoly equilibrium but retailer 2, who is charged
a lower fee than previously, makes strictly positive profits;
• when Q is played against B, 1 prices itself out of the market (i.e. posts price
p1I = qI and does not make any sale); 2 accepts I’s offer; it charges the monopoly







• when Q is played against R, 1 prices itself out of the market ; 2 compares the
offers and selects the one leaving him with the highest profit; it then charges the
monopoly price on whatever good it has chosen to sell and enjoys strictly positive
profits.
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Obviously, playing strategy A brings I the duopoly profit π∗I . Every strategy in the
support of Q must bring the same profit. Given φ2I , the profit is equal to that fee times
the probability that it is accepted by 2. That translates into the following equation:
φ2I
{








= π∗I . (78)





































and we must have








Similarly, playing strategy B earns E a payoff of απ∗E. Every strategy φE in the

























































and that we must have









It is easily verified that all probabilities lie between 0 and 1 and that the cumulative
distribution functions are strictly and continuously increasing. Thus, we have a well-
defined mixed-strategy equilibrium in the subgame where S = 1 and N = 2.
It is easy to derive the producers’ equilibrium profits. I receives π∗I on average,
whereas E receives π∗I +
qE−qI
4
, which is less than its standard duopoly profit. Given
assumption (A2), this is always greater than F , so that E should decide in favor of
entry if S = 1.
The question then becomes: can I induce 2 to sign on the exclusivity contract by
compensating him for the profit he would then forego? I’s total willingness to pay is
qI
4
−π∗I . The determination of 2’s exact equilibrium payoff, π
m
2 , requires the computation
of integrals; a logarithmic term appears and makes comparisons difficult. Yet, it suffices
to bound πm2 from above. Given the structure of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, when I
plays Q, the best that 2 can get is I’s monopoly rents. When I plays A, 2 earns nothing
when E plays B and gets at most E’s standard duopoly profit minus the smallest fee
charged by E when it plays R. That is











































then we will have proven that I can profitably compensate potential deviators with the













The left-hand side is increasing in α. Assume for the time being that it is possible

















then we are done.
























































thereby showing that the previous inequality is true.





which is greater than 1/3 since qE > qI > 0.














It remains to show that α is indeed larger than 3/4. A direct computation gives
α =
16 (qE)




which is greater than 3/4 since qE > qI > 0.
Therefore, if the mixed-strategy equilibrium we have described is played in the
subgame where S = 1 and N = 2, then there is a unique equilibrium in the entire
game. I offers y = πm2 to both retailers. Retailer j signs on the exclusivity contract
as long as y ≥ πm2 if he expects the other retailer to sign on, and as soon as y > 0,
otherwise. I enters if and only if S = 2. The prices in the respective subgames are as
indicated above. I has no profitable deviation as it earns 2π∗I if it decreases y, while it




I upon acceptance of its contract. Retailer j has no incentive
to deviate as that would bring him πm2 , given that the other retailer plays his part of
the equilibrium strategy.
There is no other exclusion equilibrium, for there is no point for a retailer in refusing
an offer y ≥ πm2 . (If the other retailer accepts this offer, it makes π
m
2 in expectation;
if the other retailer accepts, it makes zero profit.) Thus, if there was an exclusion
equilibrium candidate involving y > πm2 , I could decrease his upfront payment and still
induces acceptance.
There is no “entry equilibrium”. In any profile involving S = 0, retailers make zero
profit at time t3. It is sufficient for I to set y > π
m
2 to induce acceptance by both
retailers and increase its profit. QED
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